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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does a trial Court have inherent authority to dismiss, sua 
sponte, an action for lack of prosecution? 
2. What is the proper standard of review on appeal when a 
Court sua sponte dismisses a case? 
3. Is a Court bound by a procedural stipulation between 
parties? 
4. Did the Court abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs1 
Motion to Set Aside Dismissal? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from an Order denying Plaintiffs1 Motion to 
Set Aside Order of Dismissal, and Order Affirming Dismissal with 
Prejudice, filed April 4, 1985. The Order was issued pursuant to a 
hearing held March 18, 1985. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An exhaustive review of the record follows. It is set forth in 
detail inasmuch as the Trial Court reviewed the entire file orally 
during the March 18, 19 85, hearing from which the Browns appeal. 
The Plaintiffs (hereinafter "the Browns") filed a Complaint or 
June 15, 1981, through counsel (hereinafter "Mr. Miles") against 
Defendants (hereinafter "the Konings") to force the Konings tc 
complete road improvements that the Konings allegedly representee 
would be done at their expense. After the Browns posted < 
non-resident cost bond, the Konings answered on July 6, 1981. 
For ten and one-half months no activity appeared in the Cour 
file. Finally, on May 24, 1982, the Browns noticed a Deposition 
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and also filed a Motion to Amend Complaint (Record, Page 15-16). On 
June 14, 1982, a hearing was held on the Browns1 Motion to Amend 
Complaint. Mr. Miles did not appear at the hearing, and the Motion 
was denied subject to renewal at a later date (Record, Page 19) . 
The Motion was never renewed. On June 16, 1982, the Notice of 
Taking Deposition filed May 27, 1982 was refiled, and the Deposition 
was scheduled for July 9, 1982 (Record, Page 17). 
On June 21, 1982, an appearance of co-counsel (hereinafter "Mr. 
Maycock") was filed on behalf of Defendants (Record, Page 20) . On 
July 9, 1982, and July 16, 1982, the Konings filed two Motions for 
Protective Orders (Record, Pages 23-27). The Motions requested that 
Defendants depositions not be taken. They did not speak to any 
other discovery methods, and in fact, were never ruled on by the 
Court. From the time Defendants1 Motions were filed until April 4, 
1983, a period of almost nine months, the Court file showed no 
activity. The Browns did not resist the Konings1 Motion, nor did 
they attempt other discovery such as Requests for Admissions or 
Interrogatories. 
On October 26, 1982, the Konings original counsel (hereinafter 
"Mr. Thorley") filed a withdrawal of counsel and mailed copies to 
co-counsel, Mr. Maycock, and to Mr. Miles (Record, Page 28). 
On April 4, 1983, the Browns filed Interrogatories with the 
Court. The Mailing Certificate on the Interrogatories shows that 
they were mailed to Mr. Thorley only (Record, Page 34) , who had 
withdrawn from the case some six and one/half months earlier 
(Record, Page 28) . The Browns never mailed the Interrogatories to 
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Mr. Maycock, and Mr. Miles blamed this oversight on his secretary 
(Transcript, Page 3, lines 20-22). 
The Court file shows no activity for eight months until 
December 5, 1983, when the Court, on its own motion, filed an Order 
to Show Cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute, and a Notice of Pretrial Hearing, both to be heard on 
March 19, 1984 (Record, Pages 35-36). During this eight-month 
hiatus, the Browns never contacted the Konings to ascertain why the 
Interrogatories had not been answered (Record, Page 39) . Neither 
did they move the Court for sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On the morning of March 19, 1984, 
the parties, through counsel, contacted the Court and asked for a 
continuance. A Minute Entry was filed noting that a continuance had 
been granted until April 16, and that neither party had appeared at 
the hearing (Record, Page 42). 
In the latter part of March, 1984, a flurry of activity appears 
in the Court file. An Amended Mailing Certificate and Letter fror 
Mr. Miles to Mr. Maycock was filed March 22, 1984 (Record, Page 39) 
On March 28, 1984, the Court on its own motion again filed an Orde: 
to Show Cause and a Notice of Pretrial Hearing, both to be hear-
April 16, 1984 (Record, Pages 40-41). On April 16, 1984, a Minut 
Entry filed with the Court reflects that a Pretrial Hearing was hel 
on the case. No one appeared. The matter was continued for 6 
days (Record, Page 42). On April 19, 1984, a Stipulation regardin 
Interrogatories, was filed with the Court. The Stipulation wa 
signed by counsel for both parties, and paragraph 3 stated: 
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3. That this matter should be stricken from the Courts' 
Pretrial calendar until the parties have completed their 
discovery or until either party requested a Pretrial 
conference (Record, pages 43-44). 
On April 30, 1984, the Trial Court, on its1 own Motion, mailed 
to counsel of record, Notice of Trial Setting scheduled for June 18, 
1984 (Record, Page 45) . Mr. Miles states that he called the Trial 
Court executive and informed her of the Stipulation on file in the 
Court (Transcript, Page 6, lines 10-12). On May 19, 1984, the Trial 
Court executive changed the non-jury trial to a Pretrial Hearing, 
and sent notice to the parties (Record, Page 46). 
Mr. Miles states that he contacted the Court before the June 
18, 19 84 hearing, and discussed with the Court a settlement between 
the parties (Transcript, Page 6, lines 15-29). According to Mr. 
Miles, the Judge told him that neither party would need to attend 
the Pretrial Hearing (Transcript, Page 7, lines 1-4). On June 18, 
1984, the matter was called on for hearing at the Pretrial 
Conference. No one appeared on behalf of either party. The Court 
noted that the matter had been set several times for Pretrial and no 
one had ever appeared. The Court ordered the matter dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits. The Court further stated: 
The Minute Entry will serve as the Order 
of Dismissal. A copy is to be mailed to the 
respective parties. (Emphasis added) (Record, 
Page 48) 
On June 28, 1984, the District Court Clerk mailed copies of the 
Minute Entry to Mr. Miles and Mr. Maycock (Record, Page 49). 
Over seven and one-half months passed from the time the Court 
nailed the Minute Entry to Mr. Miles until the Browns filed a Motion 
to Set Aside Dismissal and Affidavit of John Miles on February 25, 
1985 (Record, Pages 52-56). During this time, Mr. Maycock filed a 
Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel (Record, page 50). On March 18, 
1985, the Konings filed an Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Set 
Aside Dismissal (Record, Page 58). Among other things, the Konings 
claimed that during the seven and one-half month interim from the 
signing of the Minute Entry, the Konings had sold their shares in 
Leisure Sports, Inc., and that the Konings and the buyers of the 
stock had relied on the Minute Entry as part of the decision to sell 
and buy the stock of the corporation. Also on March 18, 1985, 
Browns filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside 
Dismissal, and also filed a letter from Mr. Miles to a Mr. Hardy, 
the Browns1 Nevada attorney (Record Pages 61-90). 
On March 18, 1985, the Browns1 Motion came on for hearing. Mr. 
Miles was present as counsel for the Browns, Mr. Russell J. Galliar 
appeared as counsel for the Defendants. Both counsel argued the 
matter. Exhibits were offered by the Browns; some were receivec 
into evidence, some were excluded after objection. The matter wai 
fully presented to the Court, and the Court reviewed the entire fil< 
orally in Open Court. Thereafter the Browns1 Motion was denied, an< 
an Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal, and Orde 
Affirming Dismissal with Prejudice were filed April 4, 1985. 
On April 24, 1985, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal and 
Cost Bond. The Browns filed an Appellants1 Brief with the Suprem 
Court on September 9, 1985. 
_ Q _ 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A trial court has the inherent ability to dismiss a lawsuit for 
lack of prosecution, and after a hearing on the matter, this trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by so doing. 
Furthermore, the trial court is not bound by a procedural 
stipulation between parties, especially after a long period of time 
and where circumstances have changed dramatically. 
Finally, the lower Court acted properly in excluding various 
exhibits offered at the hearing on Browns1 Motion to Set Aside 
Dismissal. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
A TRIAL COURT CAN, SUA SPONTE, DISMISS AN ACTION WITH PREJUDICE 
FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION. 
The Browns contend that the language of Rule 41 (b) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, by negative implication, prohibits involuntary 
dismissals for failure of the Plaintiff to prosecute except upon 
motion by the Defendant (Brief of Appellants, Page 13). This is 
simply untrue. In Brasher Motor & Finance Company v. Brown, 23 Utah 
2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969), the trial court on its own motion 
dismissed the action. Defendants appealed, contending that the 
court had no authority to dismiss because of Rule 41 URCP. This 
Court stated: 
In dismissing an action for want of prosecution, 
the court may proceed under the statute [URCP 41(b)], 
or it may, of its own motion, take action to that end. 
In acting on its own motion, the court must proceed 
with judicial discretion. Its ruling will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless it is manifest from the 
record that the court's discretion has been abused. 
23 Utah 2d at 248, 461 P.2d at 465. 
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Later Utah decisions have followed this rule. See K.L.C. 
Incorporated v. McLean, 656 P.2d 986 (Utah 1982); Wilson v. Lambert, 
613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980). 
The Supreme Court of the United States was faced with this same 
issue relating to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, after which the Utah rule is fashioned. In Link v. 
Wabash R.Co. , 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962) the Court stated: 
Neither the permissive language of the rule—which 
merely authorizes a motion by the defendant—nor 
its policy requires us to conclude that it was the 
purpose of the rule to abrogate the power of courts, 
acting on their own initiative, to clear their 
calendars of cases that have remained dormant 
because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the 
parties seeking relief. The authority of a court 
to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has 
generally been considered an "inherent power," 
governed not by rule or statute but by the control 
necessarily vested in courts to manage their own 
affairs to as to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases. 
Utah case law and the great weight of authority gives a Court 
"inherent authority" to dismiss cases for lack of prosecution. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SUA 
SPONTE, DISMISSED THE CASE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. 
Whether an action should be dismissed for failure to diligently 
prosecute rests largely within the discretion of the trial court. 
Grundman v. Williams & Peterson, 685 P.2d 539 (Utah 1984). On 
review the trial court's decision will not be interfered with unless 
it clearly appears that the court has abused its discretion. 
Department of Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1980); 
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Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (1973); 
Brasher Motor & Finance Co. v, Brown, supra. 
Beginning with Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen 
Construction, Inc. , 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) a series of cases 
arising out of Rule 41 (b) Motions to Dismiss made by one of the 
parties, have enunciated factors that a trial court should consider 
when ruling on a motion made by one of the litigants. See also, 
Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977); Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 
565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977); Department of Social Services v. Romero, 
supra. Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, supra, enumerated the Westinghouse 
factors as follows: 
1. The conduct of both parties. 
2. The opportunity each has had to move the case forward. 
3. What each of the parties has done to move the case forward. 
4. What difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the 
other side. 
5. And, most important, whether injustice may result from the 
dismissal. 
The Utah Oil case also mentions a standard as to whether or not 
the mere lapse of time in prosecuting a claim for relief is 
sufficient to support a dismissal with prejudice. The Court cited 
Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 
(1959) , for the proposition that where all of the litigants have 
power to obtain relief and have failed to do so, it is error to 
dismiss with prejudice. 
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This list of considerations affecting a party seeking dismissal 
under Rule 41 (b) stems in part from a fear that through chicanery, a 
party can intentionally delay a case and then move for dismissal. 
In Department of Social Services v. Romero, 565 P.2d at 1325, the 
Court stated: 
[W]e are not impressed with either (the) fairness 
or propriety in one party sitting silently by for a 
long period of time, then attempting to blame the other 
party for the delay as a means of escaping the effects 
of a judgment. 
The cases cited above are all procedurally different than this 
case, however. In those cases, a litigating party moved under Rule 
41(b) for dismissal. Here, the Court dismissed the action on its 
own motion. 
In stating the standard for review where a court, on its own 
motion, has dismissed a lawsuit for failure to prosecute the Court 
said: 
In acting on its own motion, the Court must proceed 
with judicial discretion. Its ruling will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless it is manifest from the 
record that the Court's discretion has been abused. 
Brasher Motor & Finance Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah 2d at 
248, 461 P.2d at 465. 
The United States Supreme Court case of William Link v. Wabast 
R. Co., supra, is in agreement. 
In reviewing a trial court's dismissal for lack of prosecutioi 
brought sua sponte, this Court need only consider whether the tria.' 
court abused its discretion. The trial court need only have focuse< 
on the duty of the Plaintiff to move the case along, whethe 
Plaintiff had any justifiable excuse for failure to do so, an 
whether or not the Defendant unduly delayed or hindered Plaintiff1 
efforts. 
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III. 
A TRIAL COURT IS NOT BOUND BY PROCEDURAL STIPULATIONS 
BETWEEN PARTIES WHERE CONDITIONS HAVE MATERIALLY CHANGED AND SPECIAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST RENDERING ENFORCEMENT OF THE STIPULATION UNJUST. 
On April 19, 1984, a "Stipulation Regarding Interrogatories" 
was filed with the court. It allowed Defendants to have 30 
additional days to respond to Interrogatories, and paragraph 3 
stated: 
3. That this matter should be stricken from the 
Court's Pretrial Calendar until the parties have 
completed their discovery or until either party 
requests a Pretrial Conference. 
Thereafter, a Pretrial Hearing, set by the court, was held on 
June 18, 1984. When neither party appeared, the court ordered the 
matter dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
The Browns contend on appeal that the court and the Konings 
were bound by the Stipulation, that the court abused its discretion 
by disregarding the filed Stipulation, at the Pretrial Hearing, and 
again, during the hearing when Browns' Motion to Set Aside Dismissal 
was denied. 
In First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C. M. Zundell & 
Associates, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979), this Court set forth the 
general rule as to stipulations when it stated: 
Ordinarily, courts are bound by stipulations between 
parties (Citations omitted). Such is not the case, 
however, when points of law requiring judicial 
determination are involved (Citations omitted). 
Parties are bound by their stipulations unless 
relieved therefrom by the court, which has the power 
to set aside a stipulation entered into inadvertently 
or for justifiable cause. (Citations omitted; 
emphasis added). 
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In the instant case, a stipulation signed by counsel was filed 
with the Court on April 19, 1984. The trial court apparently 
disregarded the stipulation and two months later dismissed the 
action with prejudice. Copies of the Minute Entry were mailed to 
counsel on June 28, 1984. Mr. Miles admited receiving the Minute 
Entry, but did nothing about it until he was called by Mr. Brown in 
January, 1985, whereupon Mr. Miles became aware of the Minute Entry 
(See Transcript, page 7, lines 13-25). 
After the June 18, 1984, hearing where the Judge dismissed the 
case, but before Mr. Miles acted on the Minute Entry some seven 
months later, the Konings sold their shares in Leisure Sports, Inc., 
to a third party. The Konings materially changed their position in 
reliance upon the Minute Entry by stating to the buyer of the stock 
that there was no litigation pending against Leisure Sports, Inc. 
The third party purchaser relied on the Konings1 assertions in 
deciding to purchase the stock. (See Affidavit of the Konings). 
Because of this material change in circumstances, it would be unjust 
to enforce the Stipulation, and the Trial Court did not abuse its 
discretion at the hearing on Motion to Set Aside Dismissal by 
disregarding the stipulation. 
IV. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING THE 
BROWNS1 MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL. 
An analysis of the facts of this case under the standards 
discussed above, shows that this case has not been prosecuted 
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: o - n 
4T ^ „ 4- V- Q 
"re i : < ne-half month hi.:**. *- t I w-.- 1 - :>—.- -
filed a hocie 
motion came before the Court, the Browns d m :\- t attenc -che hearing 
and the motion was denied subject, to renewal au a later date 
'"--•• . : ,. .-: renewed. 
v.. th-.r . a:;•=-.• time, trie Browns also notice^ m e deposition 
Konine (Reotrd T': -c-; "' N ,„....... * 
• v...:- •_ deposition ^Record, Pages _i-„ -
motions stated that . federal Court had granted -rr—^c+m?- cy*~A r 
such that information discovered in il In,1" • . • 
disclosed or used except in that action • The state Jcur* riemr 
ruled or: iio ,ti::nf a:::, m fac**, norb*^ <m*r hmpenea. T m 
Browns --1. • • _ i_. L. m.,er? nor ^. . 
they atmmpt tv.
 t- u\-ut. Li:.t;i discovery devic; 3 at that time. 
- mt; - i T m.-'^ ^}ar sed he^re the Brc*.. I' 1 I ml 
In- -: :j r-owns uiou-^ dd the 
interr^cdtori^ the Rollings, they only mailed Interrogatories rj 
Mr, Thorle,p (Pe^md, Paqo "^ 41, who had wi • ^ i!» ,*<*" tr m .K 
hij e<ji:Jit»L (I'tMjord, paqe 'U). The Browns never 
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bothered to mail Interrogatories to Mr. Maycock, who filed a Notice 
of Appearance as co-counsel some ten months earlier. This mistake 
was blamed on Mr. Miles secretary (Transcript Pg. 3, Lines 20-22; 
Record, Page 20) . Mr. Thorley never forwarded the Interrogatories 
to Mr. Maycock. 
These Interrogatories sat unanswered for one year because the 
Browns had not mailed them to Konings' proper counsel. During the 
year, the Browns never tried to make contact to ascertain why the 
Interrogatories were not being answered, nor did the Browns apply 
for an order from the Court compelling discovery as set forth in 
Rule 37, URCP. 
5. After receiving an Order to Show Cause why the case should 
be dismissed for lack of prosecution, the Browns finally discovered 
that the Konings had never received the Interrogatories (Record, 
Page 39). The Browns thereafter entered into a Stipulation with the 
Konings striking the case from the court's pretrial calendar "until 
the parties have completed their discovery, or until either party 
requests a Pretrial Conference." The Stipulation also granted the 
Konings 30 days to answer the Interrogatories (Record, Page 43) . 
Before the Stipulation was filed, the Court again noticed the matter 
for a Pretrial Hearing (Record, Page 40). Mr. Miles alleges that he 
talked to the court on two separate occasions immediately before the 
hearing, and was informed that neither he nor counsel for the 
Konings needed to appear at the hearing (Transcript, Page 6, lines 
1-2; Page 7, lines 1-4). While the record does not clearly state 
this, it is obvious that the trial court did not believe that Mr. 
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Miles h^d made t^ir- ~^-4~ :i then 
- .:•; a::... -aii*:a, and .^  ,
 tie showed :or either s ; 1 
the u-.urt dismissed the a«;v io:: v^ i-h prejudice 'Rpcor^ ni :-
Aside Dismissal u m i 1 scm^ ^1" week- lat^. 
should ..dv« beer, "completive; discover/ • attempting settlement 
the nna-^er even afto^- * i ""- — " *'•'*' 
wene aware ILa po-**: i- i.. ^  • J« dv-ne aut-hi : re, prosecute m e 
case before, and did nothing after the dismiss,' -"'-r.': is 
void of any smii aol r it "lllin Minwn ihd .nings 
alter the 'ill-day extension had run and no Answers to Interrogatories 
had been received. Not: d;o'] they move undei Ruit 
compel 1 m o iiist:o^reT\ [ICO'IIK-M did. '! hey attempt -,;.y oiwci lorms . : 
discovery. In fact, at the March 18, 1985, hear P.C * he Frew-?1 
Motion to Set P-ide Hismispn I , Mi I li 1 stated Ui«"H (• In-.' Minute 
V had beei . .o him but thai: 
[I]t was right at that time that tw o of 
our secretaries had quit and we hired two more, 
and for some reason this notice didn't come to 
my attention. It was placed in the file and 
sat there until Mr, Brown called me sometime 
in January asking about his case and I said, 
'Well, haven't you settled with Mr. Koning?' 
And he indicated that it had not been 
accomplished. After the passage of that 
six-month period of time, I assumed that the 
two of them, since he had not gotten back in 
touch with me, had worked something out on 
their own. (Tr. ~ "" lines 13-24). 
F • , :. .'IL- ,uin^ for rear*!- eight 
months a f t e i t ' ' ' r - I l r . t iy . The ,<: :w,i , c^d : ; .„ h o r ^ . Liie terms 
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of the Stipulation that they now claim the Court should have 
enforced. 
6, The critical aspect of this case turns on the fact that Mr. 
Miles received a copy of the Minute Entry dated June 18, 1984, 
notifying him that the case had been dismissed, and he did nothing 
about it for over eight months. Mr. Miles attempts to excuse his 
non-action by claiming that his secretaries did not bring the matter 
to his attention (Transcript, Page 7, lines 13-24). If attorneys 
were allowed to hide behind the alleged mistakes of their 
secretaries, legal secretaries would carry malpractice insurance 
because attorneys would blame them whenever mistakes were made in 
law offices. 
The reason that Mr. Miles1 neglect of the Minute Entry assumes 
such importance is that after the entry, but before Mr. Miles 
learned of the entry, the Konings, relying on the Minute Entry, sold 
their entire interest in Leisure Sports, Inc., to a third party. 
During this interim then, circumstances had materially changed. 
The Browns should have made a Rule 60 (b) motion immediately 
after receiving the Minute Entry of June 18, 1984. The Browns state 
that " . . . an unsigned Minute Entry does not constitute a final 
judgment." They claim that they could not have appealed this Minute 
Entry to the Supreme Court until a final judgment or order appeared 
in the record (Appellant's Brief Pages 11-12). The Browns1 point is 
well taken. Their proper course after receiving the Minute Entry 
complained of was the corrective remedy provided by Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the reopening of 
cases in which orders have been inadvisedly entered. Rule 60(b) 
reads in pertinent part as follows: 
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(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly 
Discovered Evidence; Fraudf etc. On motion and upon 
such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance 
cf justice, relieve a party or his legal representative 
frcm any final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
:allowing reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertenence, surprise, 
_-r excusable neglect; . . . or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and 
for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than three 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken, 
T\ ¥ \z : -t .-".-* I*":'. t:. Dismissal bf ^ ause -^ r:stake-
inadvertenence I^1"-" r • r< • * 
proper b^::r^ * _ __w^\ .„« . * ..*.. i A , ee uu ,itns o: trx- Minute 
Entry. But, ke:au:ro files' neglect i 1* ^hi? matter, 
reasons - '- - -__e neglaji 
could not tr . v. AG - : : - rase set as:de because rv. tior. wbs 
not made within threp no^-h^ of thr> Minute ,-""ur-. 
wi.o.. l.iej«viuj:i • f 1 llii.1 change -i circumstances after the 
Minute intr: , * -rp remained no justification to move under Rule 
60 (b; 
* •_ thrown ..... .^ir0 t^ mov^ timely t~ ^et a si do lVe dismissal 
should no* r "isited uocr- trie Koning^ ci L..W uiu-^ par*-v wnv-> bought 
Leisur S; - * z . 
:; -aking this appeal, the Browns have been less than 
d:..iige:.t4 '-.:'.- -3 >'tjr. :-.u.t^  ,1 ^pnellaf^ Procedure, states t^ .ir 
"witr • * -fL^ '- . . . : 
Appel-ci^i dhc-ii i-.^-i H : c ckermg Statement with h-* C*.erk ~ 
the Supreme Cor-- ! 
' ' - J w.. c..- o .. . ..'jeji was filed May 2 , 
1935, under Rule •• • • * -ales of Appellate Procedure the Browns 
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had until May 23, 1985 to file a Docketing Statement. The Browns 
did not prepare and mail the Docketing Statement until June 19, 
1985, a period of 48 days, more than twice the time allowed for 
under the rules. Rule 9(e) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states 
that "failure to comply may result in dismissal of the appeal or 
petition." The Konings ask this Court to dismiss Browns1 appeal for 
failure to comply with the rule. 
B. The Konings did not cause the Browns undue delay in this 
action. 
1. When Browns filed their Complaint, the Konings answered 
within the statutory time period allowed by law. When Depositions 
were scheduled, the Konings made a Motion for Protective Order. The 
Browns never objected to the Konings1 Motion, and cannot now claim 
that the Motion was made to hinder and delay the lawsuit. 
2. The Konings cannot be blamed for not answering 
Interrogatories that Mr. Miles mailed to counsel who had withdrawn 
from the case six and one-half months prior to the mailing of the 
Interrogatories. The Browns cannot complain that Mr. Thorley 
(Konings1 counsel who withdrew) should have forwarded the 
Interrogatories to Mr. Maycock, who had appeared as co-counsel some 
ten months prior to the mailing of the Interrogatories. Mr. Miles 
was on notice that Mr. Maycock was counsel for the Konings, and it 
was his responsibility to mail Interrogatories to the proper 
counsel. 
3. The Konings did stipulate to answer the Browns 
Interrogatories within 30 days in a Stipulation filed with the Court 
April 19, 1984. Those Interrogatories never were answered. 
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However, the Browns never contacted liv.-. Konings concerning the 
Interroqatories, nor d* i 
compelling discovery puuuaLi ^ .\^ t- .: Urt?. furthermore, a mere 
two months after this Stipulation w * = filed tl,e 'curf dismissed Mio 
case wi Mi pro^ ij, i . . - ^  •: o.wxi^ ^^ cd 
the case stated ir. pri i I ' "The Minute Er.t]:- .-. i. \ serve as the Order 
n; Lismissal Thus there- won1' bo **o neeu u. :" IWH • I"" Hn 
/roiiaioricii I in Mi[ulaLiu .on.: oecome moot. 
Even if this Court reviews to;n *. ^  u~: : rr* fact r- -* 
forth in Westinghouse, supra, t 
" I'riaJ Court did not abuse ito discretion .. dismissing tms 
action. 
V. 
THE LOWER COURT DID ,^ M . IN EXCLUDING VARIOUS EXHIBITS 
OFFERED TO SUPPORT THE MOTION TO EKr: ASIDE DISMISSAL. 
When .'in evidential* he^r"-
i. e not o i. .' . Oui^a^ HiuiiLeni dc whei i nooning . 6 *~ ^ 
jury, because :.:: ;- I ; o assumed tnar Moo vurt -^s, ~^d o: 
* - - 3ur>>rior k" • •" _1 * * . _--
_,.„-a oe alve •:;„^^c . Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 18 
Utah .". . 12.:, -. . . . \: •: ' ^- o-tho ;" ^ r.ent wii- - ' j 
reversed for o'laence unless 
appears in +0.u . co : uha one erro was prejudicial. Downey State 
Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp. , ~ "'- *; 1 " - -
.- • .. i. hviai^ ;..j T*a.. ; 1 C^ before the 
Court, 'oie our* .• hance f _ . c: ro evidence after hearing 
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counsel's objections and offers of proof. Furthermore, the Browns 
have not shown that the alleged errors by the Court in excluding the 
evidence were prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the orders of the lower Court which 
denied relief from the Minute Entry and dismissed the Browns1 
Complaint with prejudice and on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Q day of f\hJtVtfiyi) , 1985. 
^R^S££LL jT^ALLIAN 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents 
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